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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the impact of coinsurance exemption for prescription medicines 
applied to elderly individuals in Spain after retirement. To evaluate this coinsurance change 
we use a rich administrative dataset that links pharmaceutical consumption and hospital 
discharge records for the full population aged 58 to 65 in January 2004 covered by the 
public insurer in a Spanish region and we follow them until December 2006. We use a 
difference-in-differences strategy and exploit the eligibility age for Social Security to control 
for the endogeneity of the retirement decision. Our most conservative results show that the 
uniform exemption from pharmaceutical copayment granted to retired people in Spain 
increases the consumption of prescription medicines on average by 9.5%, total 
pharmaceutical expenditure by 15.2% and the costs borne by the insurer by 47.5%, without 
evidence of any offset effect in the form of reduced hospitalization. The impact is 
concentrated among individuals who were consumers of medicines for acute and other 
non-chronic diseases with a previous coinsurance rate in the range 30% to 40%.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past four decades, all developed countries have been struggling with the rise in 
government and private health expenditure, which have increased in most countries faster 
than GDP. The recent economic recession has reduced government revenues, increasing 
the pressure to control costs. However, the experience of previous recessions in countries 
which reduced health expenditure shows that such reductions were short-lived and after a 
short period demand for health services increased expenditure (Scherer and Devaux, 2010). 
When there is severe pressure to reduce public spending there is a growing need to reduce 
less effective and less cost-effective services in order to secure best value for money and to 
implement long-lived and financially sustainable policies limiting spending without 
compromising gains in health outcomes. 
 
Pharmaceutical spending accounts for a significant and increasing proportion of total 
health care costs in developed countries. Over the last decade, public and private insurers 
have intensified their efforts to slow down pharmaceutical expenditure growth through a 
mix of price regulation and volume controls targeted towards the pharmaceutical industry, 
physicians and pharmacies, as well as increasing the share of the cost borne by users. 
Pharmaceuticals are typically covered with less generosity than other health care services in 
nearly all OECD countries (OECD, 2010).  
 
Despite the widespread use of cost sharing arrangements to finance pharmaceuticals, in 
many countries the actual level of out-of-pocket expenses for covered medicines is 
undermined by population-wide and generous exemptions from these cost sharing 
arrangements. In 2008-9, out of 29 OECD countries, 24 countries exempted from cost 
sharing those individuals with specific medical conditions and disabilities, 13 countries 
exempted seniors, and 13 countries exempted pregnant women (Paris et al, 2010). 
Therefore, the exemption affects those patients that concentrate most of the 
pharmaceutical consumption. This leads to formal cost sharing to be applied to a very 
meagre proportion of overall pharmaceutical consumption. The result is that the effective 
role of patient cost sharing as a demand-side strategy to reduce overconsumption and 
services with low effectiveness in predominantly publicly financed health care systems is 
restricted to a small pharmaceutical market share, especially in the 13 OECD countries 
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where exemptions are leading to free or nearly free prescription medicines for all elderly 
people.  
 
Despite the widespread use of exemption programmes, there is a surprising scarcity of 
economic evidence on moral hazard effects for free prescription medicines in the context 
of national health service (NHS) systems. This is especially so regarding changes in 
behaviour due to the change in the cost sharing arrangement when elderly people become 
eligible for the exemption for receiving prescription medicines under insurance coverage. 
Also, there is hardly any evidence on the existence of substitution effects on ambulatory 
and inpatient hospital care and health effects in NHS systems. An offset effect could be 
hypothesized to exist for elderly patients in the form of reduced hospital utilization when 
they become eligible for high cost sharing exemption. This offset effect may arise from 
increased initiation of chronic treatment or improved patient compliance for effective 
prescription medicines under free care. 
 
In this paper we examine the important change in cost sharing for prescription medicines 
that takes place in the Spanish National Health Service for elderly patients after retirement. 
When Spaniards transit into retirement, they are exempted from the previous high 
coinsurance rate for prescription medicines and get complete free access to prescription 
medicines for them and all their dependants. To evaluate this coinsurance change we use a 
rich administrative dataset that links pharmaceutical consumption and hospital discharge 
records for the full population aged 58 to 65 in January 2004 covered by the public insurer 
in a Spanish region. Following them until December 2006, we compare consumption 
trends of individuals who transit into retirement with those of individuals whose exemption 
status does not change and exploit the institutional features of the Spanish Social Security 
System to instrument the retirement decision in an instrumental variables fixed effects 
estimation. 
 
We find that this change in cost sharing has strong effects on both consumption and total 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Our most conservative estimates show that pharmaceutical 
consumption (measured as the number of DDDs) increases by 9.5% due to copayment 
exemption and total pharmaceutical expenditures by 15.2%. The effect on the public 
insurer is larger as it includes not only the increase in pharmaceutical consumption but also 
a cost shift from the patient to the insurer due to the exemption. Therefore, we find that 
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the costs of the public insurer increase by 47.5% due to copayment exemption. On the 
other hand, there are no significant effects on the probability of hospitalization and the 
number of hospital nights. This suggests that there are no potential offset effects. In 
addition, the analysis of the heterogeneity of the effects reveals that the moral hazard is 
concentrated among individuals who were consumers of acute and other non-chronic 
diseases with a previous coinsurance rate in the range 30% to 40%. Furthermore, the 
absence of offset effects remains in all the different subgroups.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some background on previous work 
in this area and on the policy we are studying. Section 3 describes the data and empirical 
strategy. Section 4 presents our results on price sensitivity and hospitalization offset for the 
average patient and provides evidence of the heterogeneity of the results. The paper 
concludes with a summary of the main conclusions and the discussion of the policy 
implications. 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Previous studies 
 
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), a large randomized social experiment 
performed in the United States from 1974 to 1982, provided evidence on the sensitivity of 
pharmaceutical expenditure and health care use to its own price for the non-elderly when 
simultaneous similar copayment rates with an income-related cap are applied to all health 
services (Newhouse, 1993). Average expenditure on prescription medicines of consumers 
in the least generous plan were 57% of those on a free plan. The plan response for 
prescription medicines was similar to that of total outpatient care (Leibowitz et al, 1985). 
The arc elasticity for outpatient care was -0.13 for nominal coinsurance rates in the range 0-
25%, and -0.21 for nominal rates between 25 and 95% (Manning et al, 1987). Free care 
appears to increase both appropriate and inappropriate use of antibiotics. However, no 
adverse effects on health were found to be associated with cost sharing, except that free 
care led to improvements in hypertension, dental health, vision, and selected serious 
symptoms.  
 
  
5
Nowadays, despite its random nature, the usefulness of the Rand HIE for the design of 
optimal pharmaceutical cost sharing is limited for three main reasons. First, it is more than 
three decades old and since then there has been a notable increase in cost and extension of 
treatment possibilities in all health systems, especially in pharmaceutical treatments. 
Second, elderly people, who in many countries are responsible for more than three quarters 
of the pharmaceutical expenditure, were excluded from the randomized experiment. And, 
third, the HIE does not allow us to disentangle the adverse offset effects of pharmaceutical 
cost sharing from those stemming from copayment on other health services.  
 
More recently, Chandra et al (2010) estimated modest but significant price sensitivity for 
both physician visits and prescription drug consumption among the elderly Medicare 
population in California, United States. They evaluated the effects of a simultaneous 
increase in patient cost sharing for physician visits and medicines, which did not allow 
them to disentangle changes in the level of pharmaceutical copayment from those of visit 
copayments as individual contributors to the offset effect observed in the form of 
increased hospital utilization in response to higher copayments by the most ill populations.  
Natural experiments and quasi-experimental designs for radical changes in cost sharing 
arrangements such as their indiscriminate abolition through exemption for all elderly 
people in NHS systems, where most other health services are free of charge, are rare or 
non-existent. Existing studies are not only scarce, but of limited design quality, and they do 
not explicitly address heterogeneity in the magnitude of the impact, the own-price elasticity, 
and whether free access to medicines for the elderly causes an offset in the form of reduced 
medical costs in other health services, and the presumable improvement in their health 
outcomes.  
 
Many previous cost sharing studies that focused on drug copayment impact on the elderly 
populations are simple cross-section or before/after comparisons without a control group 
(Rice and Matsuoka, 2004; Goldman et al, 2007). A survey of this literature, mainly based 
on the US and Canada, reports that increasing prescription cost sharing is not only 
associated with lower rates of drug treatment, but with worse adherence and therapy 
discontinuation (Goldman et al, 2007). 
 
Recent non-US based studies on the impact of pharmaceutical copayment using individual 
data on the elderly population are relatively few and have not produced irrefutable evidence 
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on its magnitude or price sensitivity. Grootendorst (1997), using a fixed-random effects 
model without a control group, finds that eligibility for zero copayment of British 
Columbia residents aged 65 or over living in single person households has a minor 
contribution to overall expenditure increase compared with trend effects. Atella et al (2006) 
argue that Italian hypertensive patients treated with ACE inhibitors strongly reduce 
compliance after copayment increases, which leads to increases in hospitalization and 
mortality rates. The latter effect is obtained by comparing compliers with non-compliers. 
This may not reflect the behaviour of those who have been affected by copayment 
changes. 
 
2.2 Institutional setting 
 
The Spanish National Health System (NHS) provides generous free health care coverage to 
all Spanish residents, except civil servants, with the exception of a non-refundable 
coinsurance rate for outpatient prescription pharmaceuticals, which has remained at 40% 
of the retail price since the early 1980s. A lower coinsurance rate of 10% is applied to 
AIDS patients and to medicines mainly prescribed for chronic diseases, with a price cap of 
€2.64 per prescription. Thus, effective coinsurance rates for insured patients may range 
from 40% to a rate slightly above zero for highly priced medicines under the lower 
coinsurance rate. In addition, drugs provided to hospitalized patients are provided free of 
charge. 
 
Pensioners and their dependants are exempted from this coinsurance scheme, so those 
coinsurance rates are applied only to active people and their dependants, independently of 
their socio-economic characteristics. Caps or ceilings on maximum out-of-pocket 
expenditure do not exist either. Active individuals who transit into retirement or receive an 
incapacity pension, independently of their age, and all their dependants are automatically 
exempted from the pharmaceutical coinsurance scheme and get free access to outpatient 
prescription medicines (Costa-Font and Puig-Junoy, 2007).  
 
Nominal coinsurance rates (40% and 10%) have remained unchanged in the last two 
decades although the effective average coinsurance rate has halved since the eighties (from 
15% in 1980 to 7% in 2009). The reduction in effective cost sharing might be explained by 
the increasing ageing process, a larger number of medicines with a 10% coinsurance rate, 
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and the fact that pensioners often may be obtaining prescriptions for other household 
members who are not exempt from copayments (Puig-Junoy, 1988). 
 
Our analysis focuses on the exemption from the current coinsurance scheme for the 
outpatient prescription medicines of retired people in Spain. We are interested in the 
change in consumption due to the change in the coinsurance rate among those insured 
individuals who were cost sharing and become exempted from the coinsurance (zero price) 
after retirement.  
  
 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
3.1 Data 
 
 
We use an administrative database of pharmaceutical and inpatient care utilization 
containing all the population aged 58 to 64 who were covered by the public insurer in 
Catalonia on 1 January 2004 and were still alive on 31 December 2006 (447,888 
individuals). We observe for each individual over the period 2004-2006 monthly 
pharmaceutical consumption prescribed by a Spanish NHS doctor. The resulting dataset 
includes individual information on the monthly number of prescriptions, the number of 
prescribed daily defined doses (DDD)1, total pharmaceutical expenditure, pharmaceutical 
costs borne by the individual, number of prescriptions, and average retail price per 
prescription.  
 
We select the sample of continuously insured individuals with positive pharmaceutical 
consumption in each of the three years of the study. By restricting the sample to the 
subgroup of consumers, we minimize the effects that an increase in the amount of leisure 
time associated with retirement may have on the probability of visiting a doctor to get the 
prescription for those individuals who were previously buying their medicines from the 
                                                 
1 A DDD is defined as the average daily dose of an NCE used by an adult for treatment of the main 
indication of the pharmaceutical. 
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pharmacy without a prescription (236,992 individuals, representing 53% of the insured 
population).  
 
We are interested in the causal effect of the exemption from the coinsurance scheme on 
total pharmaceutical consumption and expenditure (valued at retail prices), and on inpatient 
care utilization. Therefore, we analyse the effects of the coinsurance exemption on the 
following three pharmaceutical outcome variables: number of defined daily doses (DDD), 
total expenditure and cost borne by the public insurance. We also analyse two hospital 
utilization outcome variables: whether the individual spent any days in the hospital during 
the year (probability of hospitalization) and total number of hospital nights. 
 
We do not directly observe the type of pharmaceutical coverage (active individuals under 
the coinsurance scheme or retired individuals/pensioners exempt from it) of each 
individual, but this can be inferred from the amount of the retail price borne by the patient. 
Thus, an individual with positive cost sharing (pharmaceutical cost borne by the patient 
greater than zero) in all the observed monthly consumptions can be classified as an active 
individual affected by the coinsurance scheme, while an individual who does not participate 
in the cost of the drug is identified as a pensioner with free prescription medicines. In 
addition, we identify individuals who at the beginning of our observational period do 
participate in the cost of the drug, but from one point in time onwards have zero cost 
sharing. This last group can be classified as new pensioners who become eligible for 
exemption from the coinsurance scheme.  
 
The analysis of the effects of the coinsurance exemption on pharmaceutical consumption 
and hospitalization requires longitudinal information on individuals who change their 
insurance coverage status during our observational period, as well as on individuals whose 
coverage remains unchanged. Regarding the new pensioners, we are interested in their 
pharmaceutical consumption and hospital utilization before and after the change occurs, 
but the effects on the year in which they become pensioners may be misleading as they will 
depend on the month in which the transition takes place. Therefore, we restrict the analysis 
to pharmaceutical consumption in year 2004 and 2006 for individuals who are observed as 
active and covered by the coinsurance scheme throughout the period, and individuals who 
retire and become pensioners in 2005.  
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Our final analysis sample corresponds to 88,800 individuals: 22,909 new pensioners who 
become eligible for coinsurance exemption in 2005, and 65,891 individuals who are active 
and under the coinsurance scheme in all three periods. In what follows, we will refer to 
new pensioners as the treatment group, and to active individuals as the control group. In 
addition, we assess the external validity of our results using a sample of 118,269 individuals 
who are already pensioners in January 2004 as an additional control group.  
 
3.2 Empirical strategy 
 
We aim to identify the effect of copayment exemption on the different outcomes. This 
could be identified by the parameter δ in the difference-in-difference model (1) estimated 
by fixed effects using data for 2004 and 2006, while the change in coverage is identified in 
2005.  
ititititiit uXLCCY   '  (1)
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest of individual i in year t; α is a constant, Ci is a dummy 
variable that identifies the treatment group; LCit is a dummy for a decrease in the 
coinsurance for the treatment group (it combines an indicator of being treated and a 
dummy for being in the post-treatment period, which is the year 2006 in this case); Xit is 
the set of covariate explanatory characteristics; λt is a time fixed effect; ui represents the 
individual fixed unobserved heterogeneity; and εit is a purely random error term. In this 
model, the effect of the exemption from the coinsurance is identified by δ, which measures 
the change in pharmaceutical consumption of those with an exemption in their copayment 
compared to those who remain under the coinsurance. 
 
A potential problem with this approach is the assumption that becoming a pensioner in 
2005 is independent of the factors that condition medicine consumption, which is not 
likely to hold as one would expect individuals who suffer a sudden or even a progressive 
health deterioration to be more likely to retire and become a pensioner on the one hand, 
and at the same time increase their pharmaceutical consumption. A selection problem 
arises if people self-select into retirement based on their health status, LCit then being 
correlated with the unobservables. In this situation, the FE estimate of δ is not consistent. 
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We deal with this problem using instrumental variables. Large spikes in the retirement 
hazards at the earliest retirement age and at the normal retirement age have previously been 
found in the literature (Gruber and Wise, 2004). In Spain, individuals can first claim old-age 
benefits at age 60 and the normal retirement age is 65 (Boldrin, Jiménez-Martín and 
Peracchi, 2004). Therefore, we use the early and full statutory retirement ages to instrument 
the probability of becoming a new pensioner, as they are expected to have an effect on the 
probability of retiring while not having an effect on health after controlling for a quadratic 
age polynomial. We identify the coinsurance effect δ in equation (1) using instrumental 
variables fixed effects estimation.    
 
In order to control for changes in the health status of individuals in the treatment and 
control group we combine health information from two administrative sources. First, we 
use information from the hospital discharge register. In particular, we can observe the 
annual number of hospitalizations, the total number of hospital nights, and the annual sum 
of the weights associated with the diagnosis-related groups. 
 
We also create individual pharmaceutical profiles using the RiskSmart Global Stand Alone 
application version 2.0 (DxCG, 2005), which builds so-called Aggregated RxGroup 
(ARXG) categories. ARXGs use detailed information on outpatient claims data on the type 
of drugs consumed in each period using 18 non-exclusive categories (Zhao et al, 2001; 
DXCG Inc, 2005). ARXGs have been designed to encompass broad categories of drugs 
(active ingredients), based upon their most common uses. ARXG categories typically 
identify the major organ systems with which an agent interacts (e.g., cardiovascular drugs, 
central nervous system drugs) or the agent’s primary pharmacologic activity (e.g., anti-
infectives, anti-hyperlipidemics, diabetes drugs). In this paper we use ARXG categories as 
proxies of treated diagnoses for all individuals. We construct a set of 16 dummies for 
disease categories, which take value 1 when the individual consumed drugs related to each 
ARXG category.  
 
The inclusion of ARXG categories in a model that aims to estimate the effect of 
copayment exemption on pharmaceutical consumption may result in lower estimates if part 
of the increase due to moral hazard translates into the consumption of a new ARXG 
category. Therefore, assuming that all the new categories represent new health problems 
provides a lower bound of the estimate of the impact of copayment exemption on 
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pharmaceutical consumption. Thus, we present the results of the models with and without 
the dummies for ARXG disease categories.  
 
3.3 Means 
 
Table 1 presents the means of the outcome variables for each analysis group in 2004 and 
2006. The number of DDDs and total pharmaceutical consumption in 2004 is higher 
among the treatment group, individuals reaching copayment exemption, than for the 
control group, those who remain active. 
 
Average pharmaceutical expenditure jumped from €296 in 2004 to €449 in 2006 (52% 
increase) among the treatment group, while it increased by 21% among the control group 
(from €262 in 2004 to €317 in 2006). Similar differences are observed in the evolution of 
the average number of DDDs. The cost of the medicines for the public insurer jumped 
100% for people in the treatment group (from €224 in 2004 to €449 in 2006), but “only” 
22% for control group 1. This difference is driven not only by higher consumption but also 
by the effect of providing free drugs for the treatment group in 2006.  
 
In addition, we show means for hospitalizations by age and population group. Both the 
probability of any hospital stay and the number of hospital nights in 2004 are significantly 
higher for individuals in the treatment group. This clearly indicates that individuals in the 
treatment group are more ill than those in the control group and emphasizes the 
importance of controlling for differences in initial health using fixed effects. Hospital use 
weighted by diagnosis-related group (DRG) is also 110% higher for the treatment group in 
2004. DRG-weighted hospital use remains higher for the treatment group but the 
difference has been reduced to 41% two years later.  
 
Average age is slightly (1.44 years) higher for individuals in the treatment group than for 
those in the control group. However, we find that some individuals in our sample retire or 
become pensioners at the age of 59, while others are still employed at the age of 67.    
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Table 1. Means of key outcome variables 
 2004 2006 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
p-
value 
Control 
group 
Treatment 
group 
p-value 
MEDICINES 
Number of DDDs 
Total expenditure (€) 
Insurance cost (€) 
 
512 
262 
198 
 
568 
296 
224 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
650 
317 
242 
 
873 
449 
449 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
HOSPITALIZATION 
Probability of any hospital stay 
Number of hospital stays 
 
0.115 
0.375 
0.182 
0.787 
0.000 
0.000 
0.145 
0.481 
0.196 
0.679 
 
0.000 
0.000 
COVARIATES 
Coinsurance 
GRDs 
Age 
Men 
Analgesics/anti-
inflammatories 
Anti-hyperlipidemics 
Anti-infectives 
Biologicals 
Cardiovascular agents 
Neurological agents 
Dermatologicals 
Diabetes drugs 
Eye, ear, nose, throat preps. 
Endocrine/metabolic agents 
Genitourinary agents 
Gastrointestinal drugs 
Immunological agents 
Nutritionals 
Pulmonary drugs 
Upper respiratory agents 
 
0.283 
0.144 
58.97 
0.535 
0.672 
0.037 
0.313 
0.116 
0.298 
0.461 
0.361 
0.344 
0.257 
0.100 
0.127 
0.288 
0.258 
0.131 
0.021 
0.025 
 
0.279 
0.270 
61.41 
0.527 
0.709 
0.035 
0.341 
0.135 
0.320 
0.496 
0.383 
0.359 
0.295 
0.109 
0.140 
0.329 
0.290 
0.150 
0.021 
0.029 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.033 
0.000 
0.098 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.944 
0.001 
 
0.278 
0.199 
61.97 
0.535 
0.699 
0.043 
0.311 
0.152 
0.351 
0.495 
0.381 
0.364 
0.277 
0.103 
0.133 
0.353 
0.262 
0.126 
0.019 
0.023 
 
0 
0.282 
63.41 
0.527 
0.801 
0.049 
0.374 
0.191 
0.392 
0.550 
0.449 
0.420 
0.402 
0.141 
0.170 
0.467 
0.342 
0.187 
0.026 
0.029 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.033 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Note: p-value of Ho: mean(control)=mean(treated) 
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Instrument validity 
 
The statutory retirement ages can be used as instruments as long as they explain the 
probability of retiring. Figure 1 in the Appendix shows the retirement hazard as a function 
of age of the stock sample of individuals who were active in 2004. We see that the hazard 
of retirement peaks at the ages of 60 and 65, being highest at the age of 65. 
 
Table 1A shows the first-stage regression of the probability of retiring in 2005 for our 
analysis sample with and without controlling for changes in health status. Early statutory 
retirement age and full retirement age are important predictors of retirement decisions, and 
we can see that they are jointly highly significant. The probability of retiring increases by 2 
percentage points after the early statutory retirement age and by 38 percentage points after 
the full retirement age. The effect of age is also significant, and it shows the expected 
quadratic relationship: the probability of being retired is estimated to decrease with age 
until the age of 61, and it increases afterwards. On the other hand, we find that a worsening 
of health status is associated with a higher probability of retirement when health is 
measured using ARXG diseases, but hospitalizations and GRDs are not significantly 
associated with retiring. In addition, we estimate the Hansen J-test for each of the models 
and we do not reject the null hypothesis in all cases2.  
 
4.2 Pooled results 
 
Cost sharing exemption reduced the average copayment rate for the treatment group from 
27.9% in the year before retirement (2004) to zero in the year after (2006). The causal 
effects of this exemption on medicine consumption and hospital utilization are shown in 
Table 2. Each cell reports the estimate of the effect (δ) and its standard error in 
parentheses. 
 
The second column (Model 1) shows the instrumental variables fixed effects estimates 
where changes in the health status of the individual are not controlled for. The third 
                                                 
2 Results not shown but available from the authors upon request.  
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column (Model 2) shows the results controlling for changes in health status3. Note that the 
estimates in Model 2 can be considered as a lower bound of the impact of the exemption 
on medicine consumption, expenditure and hospital utilization, as any moral hazard effects 
that lead to the consumption of a new group of drugs are considered as the onset of a 
health problem.  
 
The results obtained from Model 1 show that on average copayment exemption has a 
sizeable and highly statistically significant effect on the number of DDDs, amounting to 
129.04 DDDs per year per person. Individuals who retired in 2005 consumed on average 
873 DDDs. Our estimates suggest that in the same year they would have consumed 744 
DDDs without the copayment exemption. Therefore, there is a 17.3% increase in the 
number of DDDs that can be associated with the copayment exemption. There is also a 
high and statistically significant increase in yearly total expenditure per person, €90.0, which 
represents a 25% increase in total pharmaceutical expenditure. Our estimates report an 
even larger response to the copayment exemption from the insurance cost for the average 
patient: there is a statistically significant increase of €169.1 in the cost of pharmaceuticals 
borne by the public insurer, which accounts for a 60.4% increase. This extremely large 
response of the insurance cost to copayment exemption represents the accumulated effect 
of the reduction of the copayment rate from a maximum of 40% to zero and the effect of 
the increase in consumption induced by the policy change. 
 
Once we control for changes in health status (Model 2, shown in the third column of Table 
2), we still find a large and significant effect of copayment exemption on medicine 
consumption and expenditure, although notably lower than those from Model 1. As 
explained above, we interpret these estimates as a lower bound of the true effect, as any 
changes in consumption driven by copayment exemption that result in the consumption of 
medicines from a new group of diseases are considered as a new health problem and not as 
an effect of the exemption. The results obtained from Model 2 for the average individual 
also show that copayment exemption results in a highly statistically significant increase of 
76.1 DDDs per year per person (a 9.5% relative increase). Likewise, yearly total 
expenditure per person increases significantly by €59.4 (a 15.2% increase), and total 
insurance cost by €144.7 (a 47.5% increase). 
                                                 
3 We include a quadratic age polynomial in both models. The full set of results is available from the authors 
upon request.  
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Table 2. Effects of coinsurance exemption on medicines and hospital utilization 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
MEDICINES 
- Number of DDDs 
- Total expenditure (€) 
- Insurance cost (€) 
129.90***(22.89) 
90.07***(14.15) 
169.16***(13.77) 
76.09***(21.67) 
59.41***(13.52) 
144.68***(13.23) 
HOSPITALIZATION 
- Probability of any hospital stay 
- Number of hospital stays 
 
0.009 (0.02) 
-0.097 (0.20) 
 
0.000 (0.01) 
-0.130 (0.14) 
Number of observations 177,600 177,600 
Notes: each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Column 1 results do not include control for ARXG categories after the intervention. 
Column 2 results control for ARXG categories after the intervention. *** Denotes significance at the 1 
percent level.  
 
The so-called “offset effect” related to reduced patient cost sharing for the elderly could 
reduce the delay in consumption of prescription medicines or lack of compliance, and 
result in reduced hospitalizations. Our results in Table 2 clearly indicate that copayment 
exemption does not significantly reduce the probability of any stay, or the number of 
hospital nights. Thus, our results do not support the existence of a potential offset or 
compensating hospital effect of pharmaceutical copayment exemption, in contrast to 
Chandra et al (2010) and in accordance with the results of the Rand HIE for non-elderly 
people.   
 
4.3 Heterogeneity 
 
We are concerned that coinsurance exemption may have different effects on medicine price 
sensitivity and hospitalization offsets among different groups of people that may have 
implications for a more efficient coinsurance design. We explore heterogeneity by the 
previous coinsurance rate, individual education level, sex, and by the main disease 
categories. We then run regressions separately by women and men.  
 
As the overall effect of exemption on medicine consumption and expenditure for the 
average patient is large, the existence of potential heterogeneity in these effects, and also in 
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the offset effect, deserves attention in order to derive policy implications for improved 
copayment designs. We explore the heterogeneity of the effects of the pharmaceutical 
copayment exemption by the level of the individual copayment rate reduction which the 
exemption represents, by sex, and by the presence of the main chronic and acute disease 
categories identified as those individuals treated, classified under any of the 18ARXG 
disease categories. All heterogeneity effects are estimated using the difference-in-difference 
model with instrumental variables that control for changes in health status, as in Model 2 in 
Table 2. We present the results for Model 2 as they can be interpreted as a lower bound of 
the true effect and the Akaike information criterion favours Model 2 versus Model 1 in all 
cases4.  
 
Table 3 reports the effects of the copayment exemption or free pharmaceuticals for those 
individuals with a previous average copayment rate lower than 15%, between 15% and 
30%, and above 30% (with a maximum 40% rate). Our results show that the effect on the 
number of DDDs and on total pharmaceutical expenditure is only statistically significant 
for the group of individuals who had a copayment rate higher than 30% before retirement. 
In contrast with most of the previous literature, there is no significant increase in 
consumption or in expenditure when copayment rates are below 30% before the 
copayment exemption. It is important to note that medicines mainly indicated for chronic 
diseases had a copayment rate below 10%, and that individuals with an average copayment 
rate below 30% were consuming a very high proportion of chronic prescriptions. Results 
for the average individual with a previous copayment rate above 30% and no higher than 
40% concentrate the effect of the exemption and show a large and statistically significant 
increase of 108.4 DDDs per year per person (an 18.5% increase), and an increase in total 
pharmaceutical expenditure of €71.4 per person (a 25.4% increase). As expected, the 
exemption from the copayment represents a statistically significant increase in the 
insurance cost per person of €161.3 for those individuals who had a copayment rate lower 
than 15%, €132 for those with average copayment rates between 15 and 30%, and €121.9 
for those with copayment rates higher than 30% (these represent a 40.4%, 32.4%, and 
52.9% relative increase). For the first two groups, the increase in the insurance cost per 
person after the exemption only captures the effect of the cost shift from the patient to the 
insurer without any significant consumption increase associated with the copayment 
                                                 
4 Model 1 results for the different subsamples are available from the authors upon request.  
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reduction. Potential offset effects on hospital utilization are not statistically significant for 
any of the copayment rate groups. 
   
Table 3. Heterogeneity in effects of coinsurance exemption on medicines and 
hospital utilization according to coinsurance rate previous to exemption 
 Patients with previous coinsurance rate 
<15% 15% to 30% >30% to 40% 
MEDICINES 
- Number of DDDs 
- Total expenditure (€) 
- Insurance cost (€) 
 
20.03 (47.38) 
62.61 (41.69) 
121.85** (41.10)
 
62.15 (45.81) 
37.92 (24.99) 
131.96*** (24.37)
 
108.44*** (28.09) 
71.40*** (15.11) 
161.27*** (14.94) 
HOSPITALIZATION 
- Probability of any hospital stay 
- Number of hospital stays 
 
0.009 (0.032) 
-0.060 (0.357) 
 
0.023 (0.028) 
-0.164 (0.310) 
 
-0.015 (0.017) 
-0.119 (0.172) 
Number of observations 34,980 50,364 92,256 
Notes: each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Results correspond to models that control for ARXG categories after the intervention. *** 
Denotes significance at the 1 percent level. ** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table 4 reports the effects of copayment exemption by sex. Results for the average woman 
show a higher increase for the number of DDDs and for pharmaceutical expenditure than 
for the average man. We find a large and statistically significant increase of 117.4 DDDs 
per year per woman (a 15.4% relative increase) and a smaller increase of 46.1 DDDs for 
the average man, which is statistically significant only at 10% (a 5.6% increase). There is 
also a statistically significant increase in the expenditure per woman of €73, and of €49.7 
for men (a 19.7% and a 12.3% increase respectively). Once again, we find that offset effects 
on hospital utilization are not significant for women or for men.  
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Table 4. Heterogeneity in effects of coinsurance exemption on medicines and 
hospital utilization by gender 
 Women Men 
MEDICINES 
- Number of DDDs 
- Total expenditure (€) 
- Insurance cost (€) 
 
117.41***(35.29) 
73.00***(20.52) 
160.04***(20.06)  
 
46.05*(27.03) 
49.70**(17.89) 
133.18***(17.73) 
HOSPITALIZATION 
- Probability of any hospital stay 
- Number of hospital stays 
 
0.001 (0.02) 
-0.029 (0.20) 
 
0.001 (0.02) 
-0.225 (0.21) 
Number of observations 82,922 94,678 
Notes: each column shows coefficients from a different regression; standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Results correspond to models that control for ARXG categories. *** Denotes significance at the 
1 percent level. ** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. * Denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 5 reports the effects of copayment exemption by the 16 ARXG disease categories. 
Our non-exclusive disease categories are formed by individuals according to the type of 
pharmaceutical consumption observed in the period before the exemption (year 2004). We 
run regressions separately for each of the 16 disease groups: analgesics/anti-
inflammatories, anti-hyperlipidemics, anti-infectives, biologicals, cardiovascular agents, 
neurological agents, dermatologicals, diabetes drugs, eye, ear, nose and throat preparations, 
endocrine/metabolic agents, genitourinary agents, gastrointestinal drugs, immunological 
agents, nutritionals, pulmonary drugs, and upper respiratory agents. We include individual 
dummy variables for multiple chronic conditions suffered by the same patient to control 
for co-morbidities. We therefore use a wider and more complete range of chronic and non-
chronic diseases than the classifications previously used in the literature on medicine price 
sensitivity (Chandra et al, 2010; Goldman et al, 2004). 
 
We find that the copayment exemption significantly increases total pharmaceutical 
expenditure for individuals who before retirement consumed any of the following 11 drug 
categories: analgesics/anti-inflammatories (€81.4, a 19.9% increase), anti-infectives (€97.4, a 
22% increase), biologicals (€105.8, a 16.9% increase), neurological agents (€42, an 8.1% 
increase), dermatologicals (€78.6, a 16.7% increase), diabetes drugs (€81.1, an 18.1% 
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increase), eye, ear, nose and throat preparations (€74.8, a 13.8% increase), genitourinary 
agents (€123.9, a 25.1% increase), gastrointestinal drugs (€80.9, a 16.3% increase), 
immunological agents (€106.0, a 21.5% increase), and pulmonary drugs (€177.3, a 46.5% 
increase).   
 
On the other hand, we find no exemption effect on total pharmaceutical expenditure for 
individuals treated with anti-hyperlipidemics, cardiovascular agents, endocrine/metabolic 
agents, nutritionals and upper respiratory agents. Once again, we did not find a significant 
offset hospital effect for most of the disease categories. We only find a slightly significant 
offset effect for the number of hospital nights of individuals who before retirement 
consumed immunological agents or endocrine/metabolic agents, a category with a small 
number of observations, but not for the probability of any stay. Furthermore, we find a 
significant negative offset (a positive coefficient) for the probability of any stay in 
individuals treated with upper respiratory agents, indicating that this probability is even 
higher after copayment exemption. Our results indicate that increased prescription 
pharmaceutical use does not translate into reduced hospitalization. 
 
Contrary to Chandra et al (2010), who only use a rough dichotomous classification for 
chronically ill individuals, in a more detailed heterogeneity analysis we find an increase in 
total pharmaceutical expenditure after copayment exemption not only for consumers of 
drugs for more acute or less chronic conditions such as analgesics/anti-inflammatories, 
anti-infectives, dermatologicals and ear, eyes, nose and throat preparations, but also for 
those treated with pharmaceuticals for chronic conditions or diseases such as diabetes 
drugs, neurological agents and gastrointestinal agents. It is important to consider that these 
individuals are treated with medicines indicated for those main chronic conditions, but at 
the same time they may be treated with medicines indicated for other less chronic or acute 
conditions. However, previous results indicate that the expenditure effect is not significant 
for those medicines for chronic conditions charged with a 10% or lower coinsurance rate 
before the exemption, which may indicate that the observed effect for individuals with 
some chronic conditions may be mainly attributed to medicines that are not intended to 
treat the chronic illness. 
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Table 5. Heterogeneity in effects of coinsurance exemption on medicines and 
hospital utilization by ARXG categories 
ARXG category MEDICINES HOSPITALIZATION  
DDDs Total 
expenditu
re 
Insurance 
costs 
Probability of 
any stay 
Hospital 
stays 
Number of 
observations 
Analgesics/anti-inflammatories 
Anti-hyperlipidemics 
Anti-infectives 
Biologicals 
Cardiovascular agents 
Neurological agents 
Dermatologicals 
Diabetes drugs 
Eye, ear, nose, throat 
preparations 
Endocrine/metabolic agents 
Genitourinary agents 
Gastrointestinal drugs 
Immunological agents 
Nutritionals 
Pulmonary drugs 
Upper respiratory agents 
101.56*** 
124.33 
89.34** 
69.09 
14.59 
70.65** 
117.20** 
66.05 
46.03 
 
70.51 
120.02* 
94.07** 
113.76** 
39.56 
34.11 
3.36 
81.42*** 
8.37 
97.36** 
105.81* 
15.09 
42.03** 
78.56** 
81.05** 
74.79** 
 
77.54 
123.85** 
80.89** 
105.98*** 
45.36 
177.32* 
136.59 
175.92*** 
104.29 
190.71*** 
228.13*** 
115.93*** 
141.38*** 
180.10*** 
184.82*** 
186.06*** 
 
186.76** 
223.64*** 
185.58*** 
204.38*** 
181.54*** 
283.77** 
282.18** 
-0.001 
-0.062 
-0.001 
0.013 
0.014 
0.023 
-0.001 
0.002 
-0.011 
 
0.008 
0.018 
-0.024 
0.035 
0.034 
0.025 
0.200** 
-0.174 
1.520 
-0.498 
-0.583 
-0.150 
-0.115 
-0.416 
-0.363 
-0.090 
 
-1.148* 
-0.217 
-0.340 
-0.546* 
0.076 
-1.191 
0.245 
121,060 
6,440 
56,814 
21,542 
53,958 
83,466 
65,094 
61,704 
47,422 
 
18,124 
23,164 
52,974 
47,274 
24,066 
3,680 
4,572 
Notes: each column shows coefficients from a different regression. Results correspond to models that 
control for ARXG categories. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level. ** Denotes significance at the 5 
percent level. 
 
 
4.4 Arc elasticities 
 
We estimate individual arc elasticities using the results of the difference-in-difference model 
with instrumental variables and fixed effects including disease categories after copayment 
exemption. We then compute the average unweighted arc elasticity and a weighted arc 
elasticity using expenditure in the before period (year 2004) as individual weights. The 
results are presented in Table 6 including 95% confidence intervals for median arc 
elasticities. Confidence intervals are obtained using 1,000 bootstrapped replications.  
 
The arc elasticity for the median individual is -0.08, and -0.07 when weighted by 
expenditure. The median arc elasticities implied by the results of the model without 
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controlling by disease categories in the after period are slightly higher: -0.13 and -0.14 
respectively. 
 
This arc elasticity for the average individual is similar to the arc elasticities calculated for 
elderly people by Chandra et al (2010) and to the ones obtained from the Rand HIE for the 
non-elderly. These results are also similar to those previously obtained from aggregated 
Spanish cross-section and time series data (Puig-Junoy, 1988). The unweighted median arc 
elasticity is higher for those individuals with a higher previous coinsurance rate, 
approximately -0.13 for those who had a copayment rate between 30% and 40% (-0.11 
when the median arc elasticity is weighted). Median arc elasticities for individuals with 
previous coinsurance rates lower than 15% or between 15% and 30% are lower (-0.07 and -
0.04 respectively) and only statistically significant at 90%.   
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Table 6. Price elasticity for total expenditure on prescribed medicines 
 Median elasticity 95% confidence interval 
 Unweighted Expenditure 
weighted 
Unweighted Expenditure 
weighted 
All patients -0.081*** -0.068*** [-0.101, -0.048] [-0.085, -0.040] 
Coinsurance rates: 
- <5% 
- 15% to 30% 
- >30% to 40% 
 
-0.069* 
-0.042* 
-0.126*** 
 
-0.060* 
-0.036* 
-0.105*** 
 
[-0.132, 0.003] 
[-0.080, 0.005] 
[-0.157, -0.071] 
 
[-0.114, 0.003] 
[-0.070, 0.004] 
[-0.130, -0.058] 
Sex: 
- Women 
- Men 
 
-0.098*** 
-0.068*** 
 
-0.085*** 
-0.056*** 
 
[-0.134, -0.051] 
[-0.100, -0.024] 
 
[-0.117, -0.044] 
[-0.081, -0.019] 
ARXG categories: 
Analgesics/anti-inflammatories 
Anti-hyperlipidemics 
Anti-infectives 
Biologicals 
Cardiovascular agents 
Central nervous system agents 
Dermatologicals 
Diabetes drugs 
Eye, ear, nose, throat preparations 
Endocrine/metabolic agents 
Genitourinary agents 
Gastrointestinal drugs 
Immunological agents 
Nutritionals 
Pulmonary drugs 
Upper respiratory agents 
 
-0.099*** 
-0.006 
-0.109*** 
-0.082** 
-0.015 
-0.044** 
-0.086*** 
-0.078*** 
-0.084*** 
-0.074 
-0.123*** 
-0.085*** 
-0.116*** 
-0.050 
-0.173** 
-0.128 
 
-0.085*** 
-0.006 
-0.093*** 
-0.076** 
-0.014 
-0.040** 
-0.075*** 
-0.070*** 
-0.072*** 
-0.065 
-0.109*** 
-0.074*** 
-0.101*** 
-0.050 
-0.152** 
-0.112 
 
[-0.122, -0.059] 
[-0.111, 0.100] 
[-0.149, -0.048] 
[-0.151, -0.005] 
[-0.056, 0.024] 
[-0.077, -0.009] 
[-0.125, -0.034] 
[-0.112, -0.032] 
[-0.128, -0.030] 
[-0.154, 0.023] 
[-0.192, -0.047] 
[-0.163, -0.055] 
[-0.131, -0.037] 
[-0.113, 0.024] 
[-0.333, -0.007] 
[-0.291, 0.044] 
 
[-0.105, -0.051] 
[-0.100, 0.092] 
[-0.128, -0.041] 
[-0.140, -0.005] 
[-0.049, 0.021] 
[-0.069, -0.008] 
[-0.111, -0.030] 
[-0.101, -0.029] 
[-0.111, -0.026] 
[-0.137, 0.020] 
[-0.170, -0.041] 
[-0.152, -0.054] 
[-0.143, -0.048] 
[-0.097, 0.021] 
[-0.296, -0.006] 
[-0.249, 0.038] 
Note: arc elasticities are calculated as ((Q2 – Q1)/(Q1 + Q2)/2)/((P2 - P1)/(P1 + P2)/2). Arc elasticities have 
been calculated using the model that controls for ARXG categories. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent 
level. ** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. * Denotes significance at the 10 percent level. 
 
The median arc elasticity is higher for women (-0.10) than for men (-0.07). Arc elasticities 
are not statistically significant for individuals with ARXG categories such as anti-
hyperlipidemics, cardiovascular agents, endocrine/metabolic agents, nutritionals and upper 
respiratory agents. Significant median arc elasticities higher than the median for all 
individuals are observed for individuals in ARXG categories such as pulmonary drugs (-
0.17), immunological agents (-0.12), genitourinary drugs (-0.12), anti-infectives (-0.11), 
analgesics/anti-inflammatories (-0.10), dermatologicals (-0.09) and gastrointestinal drugs (-
0.09). Significant median arc elasticities close to the median for all individuals or lower are 
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observed for individuals with ARXG categories such as biologicals (-0.08), diabetes drugs (-
0.08) and eye, ear, nose and throat preparations (-0.08). 
 
4.5 External validity 
 
In the previous section we have used the early and the normal retirement ages to 
instrument the retirement decision. Therefore, the estimates obtained measure the local 
average treatment effect (LATE), or the effect of copayment exemption for those 
individuals who retire because they reach the early retirement age or the normal retirement 
age.  
 
We are ultimately interested in knowing the effect of copayment exemption on the elderly 
population, and not only on those who “comply” with the Social Security arrangements. In 
order to shed some light on the magnitude of this effect, we re-estimate our models 
without instrumenting for the retirement decision and evaluate how different the effect of 
copayment exemption is, compared to the effect shown in the previous sections. As before, 
we show the results for Model 2. In addition, we use a second control group comprising 
individuals exempted from coinsurance throughout the whole study period because they 
were already retired in 2004 (n=141,178 individuals). The results of these additional models 
are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. External validity 
 Control group (non-
exempted individuals) 
Control group (always 
exempted individuals) 
MEDICINES 
- Number of DDDs 
- Total expenditure (€) 
- Insurance cost (€) 
117.46*** (4.30) 
75.28*** (3.18) 
162.60*** (3.06) 
 
67.01*** (4.68) 
47.12*** (3.18) 
119.11*** (3.14) 
Number of observations 177,600 282,356 
Note: *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level.  
 
All impact estimates shown in Table 7 are significant at 1% and point to a similar impact to 
the one in our main results presented in Table 2. The impact of coinsurance exemption 
when we use the active population as a control group represents an increase of €75.3 in 
total pharmaceutical expenditure, which is slightly higher than our estimate for this group 
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using instrumental variables. On the other hand, we find a slightly lower estimate when we 
use those individuals exempted from coinsurance throughout the whole period as a control 
group. In this case total expenditure is found to increase by €47.1 because of copayment 
exemption. 
 
The fact that our previous estimates fall within the range of estimates without controlling 
for the endogeneity of the retirement decision suggests that they are most likely a good 
approximation of the average treatment effect.       
 
    
5. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Our results show that the uniform exemption from pharmaceutical copayment granted to 
retired people in Spain has a strong effect on total expenditure on prescription medicines 
and on insurer cost without an offset effect in the form of reduced hospitalization. Our 
most conservative estimates show that individuals who were consumers of pharmaceuticals 
financed by the National Health Service before retirement increase their total 
pharmaceutical consumption on average by €59.4 per year, which represents a 15.2% 
increase in total pharmaceutical expenditure and a 47.5% increase in insurer cost. This 
estimate is a lower bound effect of the expected overall effect, for two reasons. First, our 
analysis sample is made up of individuals who were buying NHS-prescribed medicines 
before the copayment exemption. The effect on the subsample of the population that were 
buying their medicines either without a prescription or with a prescription from a private 
doctor is expected to be larger, as the change in copayment is from 100% to 0% among 
this group. Second, we use ARXG disease categories to control for changes in health status 
over time, which results in a lower estimate, as part of the effect may be captured as the 
onset of a new health problem.  
 
A back-of-the-envelope calculation allows us to estimate the magnitude of the effect on 
total public pharmaceutical expenditures. In 2006, the last year of our data, there were 
around 7.8 million pensioners or retired people in Spain. Of the pensioners covered by the 
NHS, 90.5% consumed pharmaceuticals prescribed within the public system during 2006. 
From our estimates, we know that their pharmaceutical consumption was on average €59.4 
higher due to the copayment exemption. This amounts to €463.3 million, or 4.4% of total 
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pharmaceutical expenditure financed by the NHS. The effect on the amount paid by the 
insurer is greater than in a situation in which the individuals share part of the cost, as the 
insurer has to pay the full cost. We know that on average the amount paid by the insurer 
increased at least €144.68, yielding a total increase in pharmaceutical expenditures of 
€1,012.76 million. This magnitude represents 9.7% of the total pharmaceutical expenditure 
financed by the NHS.   
 
The effect of copayment exemption is different depending on previous consumption (types 
of drugs and average copayment rate). We find significant own-price elasticity for the 
pharmaceutical consumption and expenditure of patients mainly consuming medicines for 
acute and other non-chronic diseases with a previous coinsurance rate in the range 30 to 
40%. The estimated own-price elasticity for this group of patients is -0.13, which falls 
within the range of the estimates obtained in the literature and found to be lower when 
cost sharing changes occur in an NHS (Gemmill et al, 2007). Second, contrary to much of 
the preceding literature (Baicker and Goldman, 2011), we find that consumption and 
expenditure of prescription medicines is not significantly price sensitive when free access is 
obtained by those patients who were previously mainly consuming medicines for chronic 
conditions under reduced coinsurance rates (no higher than 10% of the price). In addition, 
neither is the consumption of those patients who consumed a mix of medicines indicated 
for both chronic and acute and non-chronic conditions significantly price sensitive. Lastly, 
unlike some previous studies (Chandra et al, 2010), we did not find a significant offset 
effect through a decline in hospitalization rates for elderly people exempted from 
coinsurance rates, which may be explained by the previous low coinsurance rates that affect 
more ill patients with chronic diseases. 
 
These findings have implications for the design of an optimal coinsurance scheme for 
prescriptions to elderly and retired people. There is a significant moral hazard effect due to 
the reduction in the coinsurance rate from 40% to zero among less sick people without any 
compensation through a health improvement requiring less hospitalization. At the same 
time, it seems that a reduced coinsurance rate of around 10% for medicines mainly 
prescribed for chronic diseases for elderly people is not a barrier to access pharmaceutical 
treatment, and does not lead to adverse or negative health effects that could be avoided by 
granting free prescription medicines. However, there is no case against free medicines or 
against a 10% or lower copayment rate for chronic diseases based on the traditional moral 
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hazard theory. In our opinion, both implications point to high welfare costs from the 
indiscriminate exemption granted to elderly and retired people for prescription medicines 
mainly for non-chronic conditions that were previously affected by the 40% copayment 
rate. 
 
Some limitations may affect the results presented in this paper. First, some heterogeneity in 
patient morbidity may not be perfectly captured by our disease categories or hospitalization 
use. Second, our estimates measure the short term impact of the zero copayment in the 
year after exemption but are not able to capture other dynamic effects. Third, heterogeneity 
in the effects of the exemption which deserve attention may appear in other dimensions 
not measured in this paper, such as the income level. 
 
Fourth, concurrent changes in the opportunity cost of time of retired people that could 
influence the demand for physician visits and prescriptions have not been measured and its 
influence on the consumption effect has not been examined. As long as one assumes that 
our estimates are also a good approximation of the average treatment effect, the magnitude 
of the estimate for women could shed some light on the importance of the effect of 
changes in the opportunity cost of time once retired. A large proportion of women in the 
age range of this study are inactive and officially obtain coinsurance exemption as 
dependants of their husbands when they retire. We may presume that the change in the 
opportunity cost of time should on average be greater for men than for women. We find 
that the magnitude of the effects is greater for men than for women. This allows at least 
two non-exclusive interpretations. First, changes in the opportunity cost of time are 
irrelevant for the subsample of individuals who were already consumers before retirement. 
And second, pensioners often may be obtaining prescriptions for other household 
members who are not exempt from copayments (Puig-Junoy, 1988). This second effect is 
more concentrated among women, and dominates the gender differences in the changes in 
the cost of time. The likelihood of these assumptions remains a pending research question 
beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Finally, as in other studies on cost sharing effects, the increase in consumption associated 
with zero copayment is compatible with, but is not a proof of, moral hazard (Pita-Barros et 
al, 2008). 
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Future research should explore average and potential heterogeneous cross-price effects of 
zero copayment for different groups of prescription medicines on emergency visits and 
office visits. Also, future research should include the careful design of an appropriate 
experiment of copayment exemption for retired people using retired civil servants covered 
by a health plan with a 30% pharmaceutical copayment as a control group. Our results 
allow the development of micro-simulation models to accurately predict the expected 
impact of reforms in the prevailing Spanish copayment scheme for prescription medicines.  
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Figure 1. Retirement hazard 
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Table A1. First stage results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Over early retirement age 0.021*** (0.003) 0.024*** (0.003) 
Over full retirement age 0.386*** (0.007) 0.380*** (0.007) 
Age  -0.075** (0.031) -0.071** (0.031) 
Age2 0.012*** (0.000) 0.012*** (0.000) 
Year 2006 0.201*** (0.062) 0.188** (0.062) 
Analgesics  0.027*** (0.003) 
Anti-hyperlipidemics  0.036*** (0.007) 
Anti-infectives  0.003 (0.002) 
Biologicals  0.019*** (0.005) 
Cardiovasculars agents  0.014*** (0.004) 
Central nervous system agents  0.007** (0.003) 
Dermatologicals  0.016*** (0.003) 
Eye, ear, nose, throat 
preparations 
 0.042*** (0.003) 
Endocrine/metabolic agents  0.017*** (0.004) 
Diabetes drugs  0.030*** (0.003) 
Pulmonary drugs  0.020** (0.008) 
Gastrointestinal drugs  0.030*** (0.003) 
Genitourinary agents  0.019*** (0.004) 
Immunological agents  0.016*** (0.003) 
Nutritionals  0.028*** (0.003) 
Upper respiratory agents  0.003 (0.007) 
Hospital stay  -0.001 (0.003) 
Number of hospital nights  -0.003*** (0.001) 
GRDs  -0.001 (0.002) 
Number of observations 177,600 177,600 
F-test 1712.57 (Prob>F=0.000) 1676.07 (Prob>F=0.000) 
Notes: *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level. ** Denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
 
